distinction. However, it is not so much a distinction between volitional and epistemic states --as "intended/foreseen" implies --as it is a distinction between different volitional dispositions towards states of affairs that result from an agent's action or omission. Giving this distinction moral weight in one's evaluation of acts amounts to holding that differences in volition --specifically the differences between willing harm as an end or means and willing harm as a concomitant of what one wills as an end or means --ground differences in the evaluation of acts.
iii Some recent thinkers, however, hold that volitional states lack relevance in act-evaluation or what is often called "first-order morality," while holding that if volitional states have relevance, it is to be found in the evaluation of agents, or "second-order morality."
iv These thinkers separate the ethical assessment of actions from the evaluation of agents as responsible for acts and as good or bad agents. Accordingly, they understand there to be a significant gap between the criteria for evaluating an action and those for evaluating an agent. One might hold, for example, that while terror bombing is, other things being equal --e.g., the number of deaths one causes --no worse than tactical bombing, the terror bomber might be worse than the tactical bomber. One might think that the terror bomber is worse, not because he does something worse, but because he is, at least proximately, motivated by something worse --the deaths and terror of non-combatants --than what motivates the tactical bomber: the destruction of a military installation. v More generally, the position comes to holding that acts are to be judged good or bad without reference to the agent's epistemic and volitional states while agents are to be judged responsible and good or bad partially in terms of their epistemic and volitional states. Those who think that DER mistakenly contrasts acts such as terror and tactical bombing often hold that it conflates act-evaluation with agent-assessment, or the first and second orders of morality. Thus, the position that the first-order second-order distinction marks a gap between act-evaluations which do not refer to agent's mental states and agent-evaluations which do, is of interest insofar as it bears on the debate concerning the ethical relevance of belief and volition in act-evaluation and the tenability of DER.
In what follows, I have two goals: first, the destructive goal of articulating and criticizing the first-order second-order distinction understood dichotomously. Second, the constructive goal of arguing that differences in volitional states are relevant to act-assessment insofar as volitional states partially constitute an action and themselves admit of important differences. territory. In order for something to be considered within ethics, it must fall within the boundaries constituted by belief and volition. In the final section of this paper, I will argue that morality also has a depth which volition establishes and demarcates. It is in terms of this depth that different acts which bring about the same consequences can be contrasted with one another as better and worse, more and less easily justified. Before doing this I will present and articulate what has come to be called the "first-order second-order distinction" as some understand it to mark a gap between act-evaluation and agent-evaluation.
DONAGAN
Alan Donagan proposes what he himself calls "first-order moral questions" which concern actions as "permissible or impermissible" and "second-order moral questions" which concern "questions about the culpability or inculpability of agents". vi He describes this distinction, saying:
The distinction between first-order and second-order moral questions is related to a distinction . If one can evaluate an action without reference to an agent's mental states, there would seem to be a substantial gap between the criteria in terms of which one evaluates an action and the conditions establishing an agent's responsibility. In fact, this is Donagan's position, as he states:
Our analysis has shown that a prescription that somebody not do an action of a certain kind does not entail a prescription that he be blamed if he does it. A deed may be impermissible, and yet its doer be inculpable; and a doer may be culpable even though his deed is permissible.
viii Donagan presents two kinds of cases: first, an agent inculpably doing an impermissible deed;
second, an agent culpably doing a permissible deed.
Concerning the first case, one can cause something bad that would be impermissible to cause if one were to cause it voluntarily. For example, if in inculpable ignorance I ruin your freshly-poured concrete driveway, you can say "if he had ruined the driveway voluntarily, it would have been wrong." However, to say "if one were voluntarily to , it would be wrong" is not to speak about ing without reference to an agent's epistemic and volitional states, for 'it' refers to ing voluntarily or believingly willingly ing. One could say the same thing more exactly by saying: ing voluntarily --which is the only way one can --is wrong.
As Anscombe says:
A rule as you consider it in deciding to obey or disobey it does not run: do not voluntarily do such-and-such, for you cannot consider whether to do is conceptually the case that one cannot blame an agent for an act that is permissible nor can one hold that an agent's act was impermissible while asserting that he was not to blame. In short, the criteria of act-evaluation cannot be entirely divorced from the criteria in terms of which agents are responsible for acts.
Once one acknowledges that an act, because it is a believing willing causing, cannot be evaluated without reference to an agent's epistemic and volitional states and that these states establish an agent's responsibility for the act, then the putative gap between act and agent-evaluation closes, at least with respect to the evaluation of an agent as responsible for an act. When understood as marking a dichotomy, the first-order second-order distinction faces a conceptually insuperable difficulty: speaking of an action without reference to an agent's epistemic and volitional states.
BENNETT
Donagan is not alone in understanding the first-order second-order distinction as marking a dichotomy. Jonathan Bennett explicitly follows Donagan's account of this distinction.
According to Bennett, first-order morality is entirely divorced from a consideration of the mental states of agents. He says:
The meanings of the transitive verbs in our standard repertoire [of Bennett's position seems to be that the only excuse to the accusation of hurting, for example, would be to say "it did not really hurt" --which will probably add insult to injury. That is, the only excuse would be to comment on resulting states of affairs, never to refer to mental states.
Yet, to an accusation of hurting the accused might respond: "I did not know that it hurt" or "I knew, but I did not want to hurt you." The accuser implies that the transitive verb applies. The excuser can assert that it does not apply because he did not know, and, therefore, as described, that action did not occur. Or, he can assert that he knew but did not want to hurt, and, therefore, 'hurting' is not an entirely appropriate description insofar as it implies that he sought to cause the harm. 
THE ETHICAL RELEVANCE OF VOLITIONAL STATES
I have argued that insofar as an action is a believing willing causing, when one speaks of an action one must refer to an agent's beliefs and volitions, if only implicitly. Moreover, I have argued that insofar as one must refer to an agent's mental states in act-evaluation and these states establish an agent's responsibility, act-evaluation cannot be divorced from a corresponding assessment of an agent as responsible. I now want to argue that since an action is a believing willing causing, insofar as willing admits of important differences, act-evaluations should take into account these differences. I will focus on three distinct volitional states: willing something as an end, for its own sake; willing something as a means, as ordered to the realization of one's end; and willing something as a concomitant either of one's end or of one's means. That is, to will something as a concomitant or side-effect is to will it neither as one's end nor as ordered to the realization of one's end, but to will it solely as an associate of one's end or means. These three states relate to one another causally. does not determine what one wills as an end or as a means. To speak in terms of depth or intensity, to will something as an end is to will it most deeply or most intensely; to will something as a means is to will it with less depth or intensity than what causes one to will it as a means; and, to will something as a concomitant is to will it with the least depth or intensity, or to will it most superficially.
Insofar as an action is constituted by what an agent believingly and willingly causes, and insofar as willing admits of these three distinct depths or intensities, the goodness and badness of actions that cause consequentially similar states of affairs to obtain will vary partly in accordance with the different volitional states that constitute the different actions. That is, other things being equal, an action that brings about a bad state of affairs as an end is worse than one that brings that bad state of affairs about as a means. An action that brings that bad state of affairs about as a concomitant is not as bad as the actions that bring it about as an end or as a means. In short, goodness and badness of acts vary in part with the depth or intensity with which good and bad states of affairs are willed such that the more deeply or more intensely some good or bad state of affairs is willed, the better or the worse the action. For the action is in part that depth or intensity of willing that good or bad state of affairs.
For example, the tactical bomber would rather cause the deaths of the non-combatants than forgo destroying the military installation. He wants their deaths as a concomitant. This wanting of their deaths derives entirely from his wanting to destroy the military installation as an end and nothing derives from his wanting their deaths. For example, he does not choose some type of bomb in order to kill the non-combatants. The willing of non-combatant deaths partially constituting tactical bombing is not as deep as the willing of non-combatant deaths that constitutes terror bombing. Willing terror and non-combatant deaths as means to the end of victory constitute terror bombing. The prospect of non-combatant deaths and terror causes and defines terror bombing. Of course, the goals of terror and non-combatant deaths do not ultimately or solely cause terror bombing. Ultimately, like tactical bombing, terror bombing occurs for the sake of winning the war. Nonetheless, proximately, terror bombing instantiates a more intense wanting of terror and non-combatant deaths than does tactical bombing.
Accordingly, other things being equal, terror bombing is worse than tactical bombing.
If there were some third type of bombing the goal of which were solely to kill and terrorize non-combatants --call it "punitive bombing" --this would surely be worse than both terror and tactical bombing. xiii But why? Other things being equal, it cannot be worse in terms of its consequences. It is worse --and, the worst kind of bombing --because it instantiates the deepest level of volitional commitment to something bad. For in punitive bombing the terror and deaths of the non-combatants are ends in themselves, sought for their own sake. Other things being equal, punitive bombing is worse than terror bombing and terror bombing is worse than tactical bombing. These comparative relationships hold insofar as these acts instantiate willings that vary in depth or intensity. In short, different volitional attitudes towards consequentially similar resulting states of affairs make for differences in act-evaluation or in first-order morality.
As we have seen, however, this position is controverted. For example, Jonathan Bennett says:
[I]f a first-order morality's basic concern is to oppose behaviour that has relational property RP, that does not give it a derivative concern with beliefs about or attitudes towards RP. For example, a morality's having a basic concern with the causing of pain does not give it a derivative concern with beliefs about the causing of pain. Such beliefs are relevant to judgements in the associated second-order morality, but not to first-order judgements of wrongness. One who holds that differences in willing do not make for differences in act-assessments must explain why ethics is demarcated in terms of believing and willing and yet the variations of which willing admits make no difference in act-assessment. For example, ethics has little to say if I harm or help you in inculpable ignorance or by force and without willing to (say someone pushes me into you). Yet, ethics has much to say if I believingly and willingly harm or help you. It is puzzling to hold that harm or benefit coming about in accordance with belief and volition has fundamental importance in ethics --by establishing that an action occurred --while holding that further differences of which willing admits make no difference at all in act-evaluation. Such a position is out of step with ethic's central concern with what humans believingly and willingly cause and with what humans believingly and willingly do not cause.
Just as the goodness and badness of resulting states of affairs partially constitute moral goodness and badness insofar as agents believingly and willingly cause those states of affairs, so also the intensities or depths of which willing admits (as an end, as a means, or as a concomitant) establish differences in act-evaluation. Thus, actions are better or worse, permissible or impermissible partially in terms of these different volitional states.
I have argued a number of points. First, insofar as epistemic and volitional states constitute actions and establish an agent's responsibility for actions so constituted, act-evaluation and the evaluation of an agent as responsible cannot come apart. Second, insofar as willing partially constitutes an action, and itself admits of three distinct intensities or depths, act-evaluations must take into account these different depths instantiated in consequentially similar acts. If the above arguments stand, act-evaluations and assessments of agents as responsible ought to be understood as integrated with one another, not as dichotomous.
Moreover, act assessments ought to reflect the various depths of which volition admits, as, for example, double effect reasoning does. 
